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ABSTRACT
A distance bounding system guarantees an upper bound on
the physical distance between a verifier and a prover. How-
ever, in contrast to a conventional wireless communication
system, distance bounding systems introduce tight require-
ments on the processing delay at the prover and require high
distance measurement precision making their practical real-
ization challenging. Prior proposals of distance bounding
systems focused primarily on building provers with minimal
processing delays but did not consider the power limitations
of provers and verifiers. However, in a wide range of appli-
cations (e.g., physical access control), provers are expected
to be fully or semi passive introducing additional constraints
on the design and implementation of distance bounding sys-
tems.
In this work, we propose a new physical layer scheme
for distance bounding and leverage this scheme to imple-
ment a distance bounding system with a low-power prover.
Our physical layer combines frequency modulated continu-
ous wave (FMCW) and backscatter communication. The use
of backscatter communication enables low power consump-
tion at the prover which is critical for a number of distance
bounding applications. By using the FMCW-based physical
layer, we further decouple the physical distance estimation
from the processing delay at the prover, thereby enabling the
realization of the majority of distance bounding protocols
developed in prior art. We evaluate our system under vari-
ous attack scenarios and show that it offers strong security
guarantees against distance, mafia and terrorist frauds. Ad-
ditionally, we validate the communication and distance mea-
surement characteristics of our system through simulations
and experiments and show that it is well suited for short-
range physical access control and payment applications.
1. INTRODUCTION
The widespread deployment of wireless systems that
use location and proximity to provide services has led
to the advent of many radio frequency based localiza-
tion technologies [21]. Today, these systems are used
in a broad set of scenarios including people and asset
tracking, emergency and rescue support [11] and access
control [14, 26]. Given the safety and security implica-
tions of the above mentioned applications, it is impor-
tant to ensure the security of the location estimate and
data used in these systems.
Distance bounding enables the secure measurement
of an upper bound on the physical distance between
two devices, a verifier and a prover, even if the prover
is untrusted and tried to reduce the measured distance.
Distance bounding was initially introduced in the con-
text of wired systems [3] and later a number of distance
bounding protocols [37, 38, 16, 28, 22, 29, 4, 5, 24, 23,
33] were designed for wireless systems. In-order to com-
pute the upper bound on the physical distance, distance
bounding relies on the measurement of the round-trip
time between a transmitted challenge and a received
response. Successful execution of a distance bounding
protocol relies on two main assumptions: (i) Precise dis-
tance bound estimate and (ii) Low processing time at
the prover to compute the response. Precise measure-
ment of the distance depends largely on the physical
characteristics of the RF signal and the time-of-arrival
estimation technique implemented in the system. The
time taken by the prover to process the challenge (i.e.,
demodulate, compute and transmit the response) de-
pends on the chosen processing function and is critical
to prevent distance modification attacks such as dis-
tance fraud [3] or mafia fraud [10]. Reducing this pro-
cessing time is therefore critical, such that the prover
cannot modify its processing time arbitrarily and pre-
tend to be closer to the verifier. Some prior work on
prover design focused on using analog or hybrid digital-
analog processing in order to reduce the prover process-
ing time to few nanoseconds [28, 25]. Those designs fo-
cus primarily on the prover architecture without much
consideration for the physical characteristics (modula-
tion scheme, bandwidth, encoding, bit periods etc.) of
the radio communication signals, which form a critical
part of a distance bounding system.
Another line of work considered the implementation
of distance bounding using ultra-wide band (UWB) sig-
nals with well defined physical-layer characteristics. Tip-
penhauer [36] implemented a distance bounding system
with a prover processing delay of approximately 100 ns.
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This limits the distance modification by an untrusted
prover to maximum 15 m. While the proposed distance
bounding implementation was well specified, it is not
clear whether the prover processing time can be reduced
to a few nanoseconds and whether such prover designs
can be made practical for power sensitive applications
(e.g., RFID localization, proximity-based electronic to-
kens for access control and mobile payments).
The realization of low power provers for distance bou-
nding is very important for the development of practi-
cal distance bounding systems in many of today’s ap-
plications. For example, RFID technology is used in
a number of applications ranging from identification
and tracking of commodity goods, physical access con-
trol, animal husbandry tracking, automatic toll collec-
tion systems, electronic passports and payment systems.
Prior research has revealed that the use of RFID prox-
imity to provide access control is vulnerable to mafia-
fraud (relay) attacks (e.g., PKES systems [12], NFC
phones [13], Google Wallet [30]). The ability to realize
distance bounding protocols for passive or semi-passive
RFID devices (or tags) would prevent the majority of
relay attack scenarios.
Our physical layer scheme uses the frequency modu-
lated continuous wave (FMCW) for distance estimation
and On-Off Keying technique for data communication.
We show that due to the inherent nature of FMCW,
the distance estimation phase is only loosely coupled
to the challenge processing at the prover i.e., the dis-
tance estimation is independent of the processing delay
at the prover while keeping the security guarantees of
the system intact. This enables logical layer implemen-
tation of any distance bounding protocol proposed in
prior art. Our proposed system architecture offers com-
plete protection against distance fraud attacks where a
dishonest, but trusted prover tries to cheat on the dis-
tance by processing the challenges faster. An attacker
does not gain any distance advantage by replying earlier
or processing the challenges faster. In addition, we pro-
vide maximum distance reduction estimates for a strong
attacker who is capable of detecting challenges earlier
and relaying them to a trusted prover.
In this work, we propose a new distance bounding sys-
tem designed for short-range, low-power applications.
Specifically, we make the following contributions.
• We propose and evaluate a new physical layer sche-
me specifically designed for the realization of dis-
tance bounding systems.
• Leveraging this physical layer scheme, we design
a prover that can potentially be integrated into
passive and semi-passive RFID tags, thus enabling
distance bounding for power constrained applica-
tions.
• We analyze our system under distance, mafia and
terrorist fraud attacks and show how our system
resists these attacks.
• We evaluate our system through simulations and
experimentally validate its processing delay, power
consumption and ranging precision.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2 we introduce distance bounding and briefly
discuss the existing distance bounding systems and their
current limitations. In Section 3, we provide the essen-
tials of FMCW and describe our physical layer scheme
for distance bounding. We analyze our system against
the known distance, mafia and terrorist fraud attacks
in Section 4 and experimentally evaluate the design in
Section 5. Finally, we discuss future work and conclude
the paper in Section 6.
2. DISTANCE BOUNDING
2.1 Background
The goal of a distance bounding system is that a ver-
ifier establishes an upper bound on its physical distance
to a prover. Distance bounding protocols follow a spe-
cific procedure which typically includes a setup, rapid-
bit exchange and verification phases (Figure 1). In the
setup phase, the verifier and the prover agree or com-
mit to specific information that will be used in the next
protocol phases. In the rapid-bit exchange phase, the
verifier challenges the prover with a number of single-
bit challenges to which the prover replies with single-bit
responses. The verifier measures the round-trip times
of these challenge-reply pairs in order to estimate its
upper distance bound to the prover. The distance d
between the verifier and the prover is calculated using
the equation d =
c.(τ−tp)
2 , where c is the speed of light
(3 · 108 m/s), τ is the round-trip time elapsed and tp is
the processing delay at the prover before responding to
the challenge. The verification phase is used for con-
firmation and authentication. It should be noted that
depending on the protocol construction the verification
phase may not be required.
The security of distance bounding protocols is tradi-
tionally evaluated by analyzing their resilience against
three types of attacks: Distance Fraud, Mafia Fraud
and Terrorist Fraud attacks. Figure 2 illustrates graph-
ically these attack scenarios and the entities involved.
In a distance fraud attack, an untrusted prover tries to
shorten the distance measured by the verifier. Since
the round-trip time includes the processing delay, an
untrusted prover can reduce the distance measured by
either sending its replies before receiving the challenges
or by computing the responses faster. There is no ex-
ternal attacker involved in this attack.
Mafia fraud attacks, also called relay attacks, were
first described by Desmedt [10]. In this type of attack,
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Figure 1: The three phases of a distance
bounding protocol. (i) Setup phase where spe-
cific information gets exchanged between the
prover and the verifier, (ii) Rapid-bit exchange
where single bit challenges and responses are ex-
changed and (iii) Verification phase where the
responses are validated and distance bound es-
timated.
both the prover and verifier are honest and trusted. An
external attacker attempts to shorten the distance mea-
sured between the prover and the verifier by relaying the
communications between the entities. Distance bound-
ing protocols prevent relay attacks due to the fact that
the time taken to relay the challenges and responses
will only further increase the distance bound estimate.
However, it is important to keep the variance of the
prover’s processing time to a minimum to ensure high
security guarantees. If the time taken by the prover
to process challenges varies significantly between chal-
lenges, the verifier has to account for the high variance
in its distance estimation. Depending on the amount
of variance to be accounted for, an attacker can reduce
the distance by relaying communications between the
prover and the verifier.
Finally, in terrorist fraud attacks, an untrusted prover
collaborates with an external attacker to convince the
verifier that he is closer than he really is. All counter-
measures to terrorist fraud make the assumption that
the untrusted prover does not reveal his long-term (pri-
vate or secret) key to the external attacker which he
collaborates with.
Recently, another type of attack on distance bound-
ing protocols called the distance hijacking attack was
proposed [7]. The authors give a real world example of a
dishonest prover with a stolen smartcard gaining access
to a secure facility; though he is not within the required
proximity. The attacker exploits a honest prover’s pres-
ence by hijacking its rapid bit-exchange phase with the
verifier. A system’s resilience to distance hijacking de-
Prover
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Verifier
Verifier
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Figure 2: Attacks on distance bounding systems.
In distance fraud, an untrusted prover tries to
cheat on the measured distance. Mafia fraud
is achieved by an external attacker by relaying
information between a trusted prover and veri-
fier. In terrorist fraud, the prover colludes with
an external attacker to cheat on the measured
distance.
pends on the higher level protocol implementation and
is independent of the physical-layer. Therefore, in this
work we do not address distance hijacking attacks.
2.2 Distance Bounding Implementations
A number of distance bounding protocols were pro-
posed following the work of Brands and Chaum [3].
These protocols provide resilience against one or all of
the above mentioned attacks. However, the security of
these protocols was mostly analyzed based on informa-
tion theoretic proofs without considering physical layer
attacks. For example, a protocol is said to be resilient
against distance fraud attacks if the response bits are
dependent on the challenge bits, i.e., the prover can-
not respond before actually receiving the challenge. As
described previously, a prover’s distance is measured
based on some physical layer parameter such as received
signal strength or round trip times. Therefore, in prac-
tice, the security of distance bounding protocols also
depends on the actual physical layer design and imple-
mentation of the distance bounding system.
For instance, an untrusted prover can use specialized
or modified hardware to compute a response faster than
the delay expected by the verifier to estimate the dis-
tance. It is important to note that a speedup of 1 ns
translates to a distance gain of approximately 15 cm.
An attacker can also reduce the distance between the
verifier and prover by detecting or demodulating chal-
lenges before receiving them completely or late commit-
ting a response as shown by Clulow et al. [6]. In order
to address these attacks specific to the physical layer,
the focus shifted towards secure physical layer design of
distance bounding systems. Below we summarize the
existing physical layer related designs available in the
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Implementation
Attack Resilience
Compatible Protocols Power Reqb
DF (processing delay)a MF TF
Tippenhauer [36] X (100 ns) X X Any High
Hancke [15] X (40 ns) X × HKP [16] High
CRCS [28]c X ( 1 ns) X × CRCS High
Ranganathan [25]c X (3 ns) X X HKP based [19, 38, 29] High
Our Work X (d) X X Any Low
a A 1ns prover processing delay enables a maximum distance reduction of 15 cm by a dishonest prover.
b Power consumption at the prover.
c Focused primarily on reducing the prover’s processing delay and used frequency switching to communicate data.
d The use of slots enables us to decouple the distance estimation from the processing delay.
Table 1: Comparison of the existing distance bounding implementations in prior art.
open literature. Table 1 compares these designs based
on the power requirement, prover processing delay, re-
silience to distance, mafia, and terrorist frauds, and the
feasibility to implement any distance bounding proto-
col.
Initial distance bounding implementations [31, 27]
proposed the use of both radio frequency and ultra-
sound. The verifier that wants to securely verify the lo-
cation claim of a prover transmits a challenge using RF
and the prover responds back using ultrasound. Based
on the time-of-arrival of the ultrasound packet, the lo-
cation claim ‘l’ of the prover and the propagation time
of radio and ultrasound signals in air, the verifier esti-
mates the prover’s distance ‘d’. If ‘d’ is larger than the
claimed distance ‘l’, then the verifier rejects the prover’s
location claim. The authors reasoned out that the use of
RF communication in both directions would make the
prover’s processing delay very large making the system
unusable. One of the main problems with these systems
is that an untrusted prover or an external attacker with
a proxy node in the verifier’s region of interest can take
advantage of this. By using radio frequency as a worm-
hole channel to echo the response back to the verifier,
the attacker can reduce the round-trip-time and hence
the distance estimate. Hence, it became essential to de-
velop new methods to reduce the prover’s complexity
and processing delay.
Hancke’s Distance Bounding Channel.
Hancke and Kuhn [16] introduced one of the first dis-
tance bounding protocols suitable for computationally
constrained devices such as RFID with a specific prover
design. Subsequently, Hancke [15] further extended this
work with a UWB communication channel. In the pro-
posed channel, the verifier (here, the RFID reader) em-
beds the challenge bits as ultra-wideband pulses in ad-
dition to the transmitted carrier signal. These pulses
are transmitted with a delay after every rising edge of
the carrier signal. This delay is known apriori to both
the verifier and the prover. The presence or absence of
the pulse indicates whether the challenge bit is ’1’ or
’0’. The prototype implementation resulted in distance
bounds for near field RFID up to 1 m for trusted provers
and 11 m in case of untrusted provers. Several chal-
lenges exist in implementing this design. First, since the
communication link includes both low-frequency carrier
and the ultra-wideband pulses, the RFID tag receiver
architecture complexity increases drastically. Second,
the ambiguity in distance still depends on the process-
ing delay of the prover. Hence, an untrusted prover
with access to faster hardware can reduce the process-
ing delay thereby cheating on the distance estimated by
the verifier.
Tippenhauer’s UWB Distance Bounding System.
Tippenhauer [36] designed and implemented a dis-
tance bounding system with focus on optimizing the
rapid bit-exchange phase. Due to the ranging preci-
sion and resilience to multipath effects, an impulse radio
ultra-wideband (IR-UWB) physical layer was used for
communication. IR-UWB systems communicate data
using short pulses which are typically 2 − 3 ns long.
Range estimation is based on the time elapsed between
transmitting a challenge pulse and receiving a corre-
sponding response. In any distance bounding protocol
the rapid bit-exchange phase is the core and the final
distance estimation is based on the exact timing of these
challenge and response pulses. Since the design primar-
ily focused on the fast rapid bit-exchange phase, any
distance bounding protocol can be implemented and de-
ployed using this system. The processing delay at the
prover depends on the protocol adopted e.g., the XOR
processing function used in the prototype implementa-
tion resulted in an overall delay of ≈ 100 ns. However,
the narrow IR-UWB pulses utilize a large bandwidth
(> 500 MHz) which require both the prover and the
verifier to be equipped with high sampling rate ADCs
and DACs to receive and transmit IR-UWB pulses re-
spectively. Such high sampling rate ADCs and DACs
consume significant power (typically around 1 − 4 W)
making it infeasible for applications where power con-
sumption at the prover needs to be low (order of few
mW or µW).
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Figure 3: (a) Conventional FMCW-based radar system comprising of a chirp generator, mixer and
a signal processing block to estimate range. (b) Ranging principle: The beat frequency f∆ is the
difference between the instantaneous transmit frequency and the frequency of the reflected signal.
This beat frequency is proportional to the round-trip time delay τ for the signal to be received after
being reflected off the target object.
Rasmussen’s Challenge Reflection with Channel Selec-
tion (CRCS).
The CRCS [28] scheme reduced the prover’s process-
ing delay to 1 ns by eliminating the need for interpreting
the challenge during the rapid-bit exchange phase. In
this implementation, the challenges are reflected back
by the prover on different frequency channels. Given
that the incoming challenge is not interpreted during
the time-critical phase, the majority of state-of-art dis-
tance bounding protocols (e.g., Brands-Chaum, Hancke-
Kuhn) cannot be realized using this scheme. In ad-
dition, the lack of challenge demodulation made this
scheme vulnerable to terrorist fraud attacks. For ex-
ample, as shown in [25] an untrusted prover can pre-
calculate the responses (since they are independent of
the challenge signal in CRCS) and forward them to a
colluding attacker located near the verifier. The collud-
ing attacker can then successfully execute the rapid-
bit exchange phase with the verifier. Based on the
CRCS scheme, Ranganathan et al. [25] proposed a hy-
brid analog-digital prover design that is resilient to ter-
rorist fraud attacks with a prover processing delay of ap-
proximately 3 ns. This design can be used to implement
all distance bounding protocols that follow the Hancke-
Kuhn protocol construction i.e., the response is selected
from one or more registers based on the challenge. Both
works focused on minimizing the challenge processing
delay at the prover through architectural modifications
with very few details on the physical layer characteris-
tics of the radio frequency signal which plays a critical
role in ranging precision and data communication. In
addition, the absence of challenge interpretation dur-
ing the rapid-bit exchange phase makes the system vul-
nerable to simple response replay attacks. In order to
prevent such attacks, the prover needs to demodulate,
store and communicate the challenges back to the ver-
ifier during the final verification phase of the protocol.
This increases the complexity making it challenging to
realize low power provers.
We summarize and compare the aforementioned im-
plementations in Table 1. With the exception of [36],
all the implementations have limitations on the higher
layer distance bounding protocols that can be imple-
mented. In all these systems, the resilience to distance
fraud attacks depends on the processing delay at the
prover. For example, in the case of CRCS [28] where
the prover has a processing delay of 1 ns, an untrusted
prover can cheat on its distance to a maximum 15 cm.
Distance bounding protocols inherently protect these
systems against conventional amplify and forward relay
attacks. However, their resilience to a stronger attacker
capable of detecting challenges earlier than a conven-
tional receiver (more details discussed in Section 4.2) is
dependent on the physical properties of the transmit-
ted information (e.g., symbol duration, type of mod-
ulation scheme used). In addition, the physical layer
scheme also affects the ranging precision, complexity of
prover design and therefore its power consumption. The
complex design and strict hardware requirements (e.g.,
ADC and DAC requirements) makes them unsuitable
for power sensitive applications. In this work, we fill
this void by proposing a complete physical layer scheme,
specifically designed for distance bounding that can be
leveraged to build low power provers.
3. FMCW BASED DISTANCE BOUNDING
3.1 FMCW Basics
Monotone (or single frequency) radars transmit pulses
of short duration and measure distance based on the
round-trip time of the received pulse reflected off the
target. Such radars are more susceptible to channel in-
terference. In Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave
(FMCW) radar [34], chirp signals [2] are used to de-
termine range and velocity of a target. Figure 3(a)
illustrates the basic building blocks of a conventional
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FMCW radar system. The radar base station trans-
mits a chirp signal (stx(t)) which gets reflected off the
target object back to the base station. The reflected sig-
nal (srx(t)) is then mixed with the transmitted signal at
that instant to produce a “beat frequency”. The beat
frequency (f∆) is proportional to the round-trip time
(τ) taken to receive the reflected chirp signal; thereby
able to measure distance d to the target object.
The transmitted chirp signal stx(t) is mathematically
represented as shown below.
stx(t) = cos(2piftx(t)t) (1)
where ftx(t) is the frequency sweep function given
by Equation (2) and f0 is the starting value of the fre-
quency sweep. k is the rate of frequency sweep and is
a quotient of the length of the chirp signal T and the
total bandwidth fbw swept i.e., k = fBW /T .
ftx(t) = f0 + kt (2)
The transmitted chirp is reflected off the target object
at distance d and is received back at the radar base
station as srx(t).
srx(t) = cos(2pifrx(t)t) (3)
The frequency of the reflected signal can be repre-
sented in terms of the instantaneous frequency of the
transmitted chirp as
frx(t) = ftx(t− τ) = fo + k(t− τ) (4)
Mixing the signals srx(t) and stx(t) results in an inter-
mediate frequency signal sIF (t) = srx(t) · stx(t) which
consists of frequency components ftx(t) + frx(t) and
ftx(t) − frx(t). The difference component is termed as
the “beat frequency” given by
f∆ = ftx(t)− frx(t) = ftx(t)− ftx(t− τ) (5)
Simplifying and representing τ in terms of distance d,
i.e., d = 2·τ/c, where c is the speed of light (3·108 m/s),
distance of the target object from the radar base station
is estimated using Equation (7).
f∆ = kτ =
fbw
T
· τ (6)
d =
c · f∆ · Ts
2 · fbw (7)
Maximum measurable distance and range resolution
are two important performance metrics of any rang-
ing system. Maximum measurable distance dmax is the
largest value of distance d that can be measured using
a particular ranging system. In a FMCW radar, this
is dependent on the time duration T of the chirp sig-
nal and is given by dmax = cT . Range resolution δR is
the minimum change in distance that can be detected
and is proportional to the time resolution of stx(t). In
other words, δR is inversely proportional to the total
bandwidth swept by the chirp and is mathematically
represented as shown in Equation (8).
δR =
c
2 · fbw (8)
3.2 Data Modulation for Distance Bounding
Conventional radar systems do not require any kind
of data transmission. However, in distance bounding
protocols the communicating entities (verifier and prover)
exchange challenges and responses during the rapid bit-
exchange phase. This requires data to be modulated
over conventional FMCW radar signals. In this work,
we modulate the challenge and response bits over the
FMCW chirp signal using On-Off Keying (OOK). Math-
ematically, the transmitted signal with OOK modula-
tion can be represented as
N∑
n=1
c[n] · rect(t− ntb)stx(t) (9)
where tb is the data-bit period given by
T
N (N is the
length of the data packet to be transmitted) and c[n]
represents the payload.
The distance bound is estimated similar to conven-
tional FMCW radar systems based on the “beat fre-
quency” f∆ as shown in Equation (7). We describe the
system design in more detail in the next sections.
3.3 Verifier and Prover Design
Figure 5 shows the high-level components present in
our system architecture. We focus on the rapid-bit ex-
change phase since it is, implementation- and power-
wise the most demanding phase of the protocol execu-
tion.
The verifier’s transmitter (verifier tx) module con-
sists of an FMCW signal generator and an OOK mod-
ulator. The FMCW signal generator generates a chirp
signal of time duration T . The entire chirp signal is
divided into slots, each with time duration tb. The
prover synchronizes to these slots using a preamble that
is transmitted by the verifier. The verifier divides the
slots into challenge and reply slots such that every chal-
lenge slot is followed by a response slot. During the
challenge slots, the verifier modulates the challenge bits
using OOK modulation and continues to transmit the
unmodulated chirp signal during the response slot (Fig-
ure 4). The response slots are used by the prover to
transmit its response back to the verifier.
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After propagation delay, the prover receives
the interrogation signal.
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The prover demodulates the challenge and
computes its response. During this time, the 
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T
Figure 4: OOK-FMCW packet format: An example OOK-FMCW packet as transmitted by the
verifier and the corresponding reflected signal from the prover. The shown signals are for challenge
bits c[n] = {1, 0, 1, 0} and the prover’s processing function is a simple “invert” operation. The verifier
and prover synchronize to these slots using a preamble (not shown in figure).
When the prover receives the challenge signal s′v(t)
from the verifier, it processes it through two circuits:
(i) reflecting and (ii) response circuits. The reflecting
circuit as its name suggests simply reflects the received
signal s′v(t) after optionally amplifying it (for increased
range). The response circuit is responsible for challenge
demodulation and computation of the prover’s response
using a processing function. The output of the process-
ing function is then modulated on top of the reflected
signal. We note that any processing function proposed
for distance bounding in prior art can be used here.
Therefore, our proposed physical layer is independent
of the logic-level protocols. The computed response is
OOK modulated over the chirp signal during the cor-
responding response slot. Like in conventional passive
RFID tags, the prover can simply load modulate its re-
sponses back to the verifier. It is important to note that
the prover continues to reflect back the received signal
while simultaneously demodulating the challenges and
computing its response. The propagation delay of the
response computation path is one of the factors that de-
termines the slot duration tb. However, tb has limited
effect on the system’s overall security as explained in
Section 4.
The verifier’s receiver module receives the reflected
signal s′p(t) that contains the reflected challenges and
the prover’s modulated responses and estimates its dis-
tance to the prover. The verifier generates an interme-
diate signal sIF (t) by mixing s
′
p(t) with sv(t) as shown
in Figure 5 and computes a distance bound by analyz-
ing the frequency components of sIF (t) as expressed
in Equations (6) and (7). In addition, the verifier de-
modulates and checks the correctness of the prover’s
responses. It is important to note that, in a majority
of scenarios, the verifier does not have strict power lim-
Detector Operating current Response time
LTC5536 ≈ 3 mA 25 ns
AD8313 ≈ 14 mA 40 ns
AD8314 ≈ 4.5 mA 70 ns
Table 2: Operating current values of alternative
COTS energy detectors that operate in the 0.7−
6 GHz frequency range with response times under
100 ns. All the detectors require a DC voltage
bias of ≈ 3 V.
itations and therefore the demodulator and signal pro-
cessing at the verifier can be implemented as efficiently
as possible.
3.4 Realization of Low Power Provers
RFID technology has become ubiquitous in a number
of security-critical ranging applications (e.g., commod-
ity goods identification and tracking, physical access
control, automatic toll collection and electronic pay-
ment systems). Prior works [12, 13, 30] showed the
vulnerability of RFID based proximity systems to sim-
ple mafia fraud (relay) attacks. One of the main chal-
lenges in enabling distance bounding protocols for these
applications is the tag’s strict power constraints. Pas-
sive RFID tags do not have any built-in power sources
and derive power by rectifying the received interrogat-
ing signal from the reader. As a result, they are less
complex, work only at short ranges and are incapable
of transmitting data on their own. Passive tags commu-
nicate with the reader by modifying the signal received
from the reader. Semi-passive tags have a built-in power
source to, for example, amplify the response signal, but
still cannot transmit data independently without the
presence of a reader’s interrogating signal.
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Figure 5: OOK-FMCW based distance bounding system architecture: The interrogating signal sv(t)
is an OOK-FMCW transmitted by the verifier. The prover receives, demodulates the challenge and
computes the response while simultaneously reflecting the challenge signal back to the verifier. The
responses are OOK modulated in the corresponding response time slot. The received signal at the
verifier is then processed for both range estimation and verification of the prover’s response.
The proposed FMCW based physical layer scheme
would enable realization of distance bounding systems,
with low power consumption at the tag (prover). Our
prover design in Section 3.3 can be implemented in
passive and semi-passive RFID tags operating in the
ISM 2.4 GHz and 5.8 GHz bands using 80 MHz and
150 MHz 1 bandwidth respectively to achieve high dis-
tance precision. Since our system targets short-range
distance measurement applications (less than 5 m), the
use of 6− 8.5 GHz spectrum [18] is also possible. Given
that these tags (e.g., [8, 9, 32]) already have backscat-
ter communication capability to send back the distance
bounding response, the only addition would be to incor-
porate the response computing function which can be as
simple as an inverter or an XOR operation. There are
already several commercially available radio frequency
energy detectors that operate in the above mentioned
frequency bands with integrated comparators and am-
plifiers. In addition, the response time of these detec-
tors are well under 100 ns and consume less than 15 mA
of current. Table 2 lists a few commercially available
detectors with the above mentioned specifications that
can be integrated into state-of-art RFID tags for an ad-
ditional power consumption of ≈ 10 mW.
Furthermore, it should be noted that passive FMCW-
based RFID tags have already been deployed for as-
set localization in industrial settings [1]. In-order to
increase the maximum range that can be measured,
FMCW-based semi-passive RFID tag designs were also
explored. For example, the pulsed reflector design of [39]
can measure distances with a ranging precision of 15−
30 cm and a low power consumption of 54 mW. In [35],
1In theory, 80 MHz gives distance resolution of 1.87 m, 150
MHz of 99 cm
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Figure 6: Maximum distance an attacker can
cheat by performing an early-detect and late-
commit attack on the physical layer of the sym-
bol.
the authors present a circuit design for BiCMOS inte-
grated circuits with a power consumption of 150 mW.
Thus, using our proposed physical layer scheme it is in-
deed possible to realize provers that consume low power
suitable for deployment in power-constrained environ-
ments.
4. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security of our pro-
posed system under the distance, mafia and terrorist
fraud attacks.
4.1 Distance Fraud
In a distance fraud, an untrusted prover claims to be
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at a distance closer than the actual one. In conven-
tional secure ranging systems, an untrusted prover can
shorten the measured distance either by modifying its
internal processing delay time or by replying before re-
ceiving the complete challenge signal. In the former, the
prover implements an improved hardware to process the
challenges faster than the “processing delay” accounted
in the distance estimation at the verifier. In the lat-
ter case, the prover early detects the challenge signal,
computes and transmits back the response (sometimes
later than required also referred to as “late commit” [6])
resulting in faster processing thereby reducing the dis-
tance estimated by the verifier.
In our system, the dishonest prover does not gain
any distance advantage by speeding up response com-
putation as distance is estimated solely based on the
beat frequency created by mixing the reflected signal
with the transmitted FMCW signal. The slot assign-
ment to challenge and response bits forces the prover
to wait until the challenge is reflected before modulat-
ing the response on the response slot. Early modula-
tion would corrupt the challenge signal thereby being
detected at the verifier during the response validation
phase. Also, the prover does not gain any distance by
executing such an early response attack as the distance
estimation based on FMCW is completely decoupled
from the data response at the prover.
The same reasoning holds for an untrusted prover
who early detects the challenge signal, computes and
late commits the response without any colluding entity
in close proximity to the verifier. Irrespective of how
fast the prover detects and processes the challenge, un-
less the prover reflects the signal from close proximity to
the verifier, he will not be able to cheat on the measured
distance.
4.2 Mafia Fraud
Mafia fraud attacks are also called relay attacks and
were first described by Desmedt [10]. The attacker is
an external entity who attempts to shorten the distance
estimated by the verifier by relaying communications
between the verifier and the honest prover. There are
two ways in which an attacker can carry out a mafia
fraud at the physical layer: (i) Amplify and forward (ii)
Early-detect and late commit of data symbols.
Amplify and forward: In this method, the attacker
simply amplifies and relays communication between the
verifier and the prover. The attacker does not modify
any physical layer characteristic of the symbol. Such a
method is insufficient for an attacker since the effective
distance computed would still be the actual distance
between the trusted prover and the verifier.
Early-detect and late-commit: Clulow et al. [6] intro-
duced the early-detect and late-commit attacks where a
successful attacker early detects (ED) the symbols from
the verifier and late commits (LC) those signals from the
prover back to the verifier. The feasibility of ED and
LC attacks on RFID was demonstrated in [17]. Here,
we analyze the resilience of the proposed OOK-FMCW
physical layer against ED and LC attacks. In order to
successfully execute the attack, the attacker must do the
following: (i) early-detect the challenge from the veri-
fier, (ii) communicate it to prover, (iii) early-detect the
response from the prover and finally (iv) late commit a
value back to the verifier. For the analysis, lets consider
one challenge and response slot. Assuming that the ver-
ifier requires at least 50%2 of the symbol to demodulate
correctly, an attacker has tb + 0.5tb time to respond.
Within this time, the attacker must perform the above
mentioned operations. If ted is the time necessary for
the attacker to reliably early-detect the challenge from
the verifier and the response from the prover, thw is
the delay at the attacker hardware for amplifying and
relaying, the time remaining for the attacker to relay
communications is given by,
tmafia = 1.5tb − 2ted − thw (10)
Since the prover is trusted, the response will be avail-
able only after the challenge slot time period i.e., tb.
Therefore,
tmafia = 0.5tb − 2ted − thw (11)
Therefore the maximum distance an attacker can cheat
on can be expressed as,
dgain =
c
2
· (0.5tb − 2ted − thw) (12)
It is important to note that Equation (12) holds good
even in the scenario where an external attacker (in close
proximity to the verifier) reflects the challenge signal
back to the verifier resulting in a beat frequency cor-
responding to the attacker’s distance from the verifier.
However, for a successful attack, the attacker still has
to modulate the response after the challenge slot period
tb. This time constraint forces the attacker to early de-
tect, relay and late commit the challenge and response
bits as described previously and hence the maximum
distance gained remains unchanged.
In Figure 6, we give an intuition by substituting nom-
inal values for ted and thw. In a real world scenario, the
values will depend on various characteristics of the at-
tacker hardware (e.g., filter order, ADC delays, signal
group delay, algorithm used to early-detect etc.). Since
tb is selected based on the delay of the challenge pro-
cessing function at the prover, it can be observed that
2Assuming an energy detection based demodulator at the
verifier with the threshold set to half the maximum symbol
energy. This can vary depending on the type of receiver used
to demodulate data.
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Figure 7: Improved verifier design including the
frequency bin based late-commit mafia fraud de-
tector.
even for an attacker with ideal hardware (thw = 0 ns),
it is impossible to reduce the distance against a system
with prover processing delay of 100 ns.
Mafia fraud detector:
The linearly increasing frequency characteristic of the
chirp signal makes it feasible to detect mafia fraud at-
tacks by analyzing the frequency components at specific
time intervals. This temporal knowledge of the signal
enables us to assign every challenge and response to one
or more frequency bins. Each frequency bin contains
spectral energy values for a range of contiguous frequen-
cies. Specifically, it is possible to estimate the range of
frequencies a particular challenge or response bit will
occupy given a slot period tb, starting sweep frequency
f0 and chirp duration T . We divide each challenge and
response slot into N frequency bins. For a successful
attack, the attacker must ED and LC every challenge
and response. A late commit on a symbol would result
in incorrect bin values and this would appear consis-
tently throughout the chirp sweep bandwidth. Thus,
by analyzing the frequency bins for expected spectral
energy values, a late commit attack can be detected. It
is safe to assume that the possibility of incorrect spec-
tral values consistently at specific frequency intervals
due to just channel fading effects is negligible, and such
an effect could have occurred due to a LC attack. The
late commit detection can be improved by dividing di-
viding each slot into more frequency bins i.e., increasing
N . The modified verifier with the frequency bin based
mafia fraud detection module is shown in Figure 7.
4.3 Terrorist Fraud
In Terrorist fraud attacks, a dishonest prover collab-
orates with an external attacker to convince the veri-
fier that he is closer than he really is. The prover will
help the attacker with information as long as it does
not reveal the prover’s long term secret. Terrorist fraud
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Figure 8: Measurement precision: The mean er-
ror in distance estimation against bandwidth of
the FMCW signal for various slot durations tb.
The SNR was fixed at 15 dB and the error is a
mean value obtained by measuring 100 different
distances within the possible maximum measur-
able distance.
resilient protocols [38, 19, 29] bind the prover’s long
term secret to the nonces that are exchanged in the
protocol. This prevents the prover from revealing the
nonces to the attacker without disclosing its long term
secret. Since our proposed physical layer is independent
of the high-level protocol, the system security depends
on the distance bounding protocol implemented above
the physical layer.
Special case of terrorist fraud: Consider the scenario
where a nearby external attacker simply reflects the in-
terrogating OOK-FMCW signals back to the verifier,
while simultaneously relaying the signals to the distant
prover. The untrusted prover colludes with the attacker
and helps him authenticate (by providing the responses)
without revealing its long term secret key. The tasks
needed to be executed by the external attacker and the
untrusted prover is similar to that of a mafia fraud at-
tacker as described in Section 4.2. However in this set-
ting, the prover colludes with the attacker and therefore
communicates the response as soon as possible. Thus,
the attacker is not constrained by the additional time
tb (Equation (11)) and the maximum possible distance
that the attacker can cheat is same as that expressed in
Equation (10).
5. SYSTEM EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate our proposed distance
bounding system using both simulations and experi-
ments. Through simulations, we analyze the bit error
rate and ranging precision due to the on-off keying over
FMCW. Then, we experimentally validate our prover’s
processing delay and ranging precision using a proto-
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5.1 Simulation Model and Analysis
The preliminary analysis through simulations were
done using Matlab. The OOK-FMCW signal is gener-
ated by mixing a binary data signal with a chirp. The
duration of a single chirp (T ) was fixed at 10µs with
the initial sweep frequency f0 set to 2.4 GHz. The phys-
ical layer parameters such as the chirp bandwidth fbw
and bit-period (duration of each slot) tb is made config-
urable based on the analysis performed. The generated
OOK signal is passed through an additive white Gaus-
sian noise (AWGN) channel. The signal to noise ratio
(SNR) of the channel is varied depending on the anal-
ysis performed. We model the receiver as two submod-
ules: (i) Energy detector for demodulating data sent
over OOK-FMCW and (ii) FMCW-based distance mea-
surement module. For the energy detection, the thresh-
old value to distinguish the bits ‘0’s and ‘1’s is set at a
value 6 dB lower than the maximum energy estimated
for a ‘1’ bit under no noise conditions. The signal pro-
cessing for distance estimation is implemented following
the theory described in Section 3.1.
BER and Ranging Precision.
First, we determine the minimum SNR required to re-
liably communicate data i.e., challenges and responses
with the proposed physical layer scheme. In our simu-
lations we vary the SNR from 0–10 dB keeping the slot
length tb = 100 ns a constant. It is observed that for
SNR greater than 8 dB, we were able to demodulate the
bits with a BER of 10−7. Next, we analyze the effect on
ranging precision due to the OOK modulation over con-
ventional FMCW radar. In addition to T , SNR is set
to a constant 15 dB. For a specific tb, the error in dis-
tance measured is determined for various values of fbw.
The error is a mean value obtained by measuring 100
different distances within the possible maximum mea-
surable distance dmax. The simulations are repeated for
tb = {100 ns, 200 ns, 500 ns} and the results are shown
in Figure 8. It is observed that the challenge slot period
1
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Figure 11: Experimental setup. An arbi-
trary waveform generator (1) outputs the OOK-
FMCW samples. The signal is amplified (2) and
a part of it is transmitted using a planar antenna
(3) and the other recorded for distance estima-
tion using a storage oscilloscope (4). The re-
ceived signal (5) is input to the OOK detection
and comparator circuit (6) and to the storage
oscilloscope.
tb has limited effect on the distance measurement pre-
cision for signals with bandwidth greater than 50 MHz.
We note that, even at lower bandwidths, the observed
precision would still be suitable for a wide range of rang-
ing applications. Alternatively, we could use amplitude
shift keying e.g., a signal with low amplitude can repre-
sent a ’0’ bit as against absence of the signal itself (as
in OOK). We use the above results of our preliminary
simulations to build and evaluate our prover through
real experiments.
5.2 Experimental Setup
In this section, we describe the experimental setup
(Figure 9) used to evaluate our proposed distance bound-
ing system. Our experiments primarily focuses on the
two critical parameters of any distance bounding sys-
tem: (i) Challenge processing delay and (ii) Ranging
precision.
A picture of our experimental setup is shown in Fig-
ure 11. The transmitter consists of an arbitrary wave-
form generator (AWG) capable of generating signals at
a sampling rate of 20 GSa/s, a 20 dB radio frequency
amplifier and a directional planar antenna. The OOK-
FMCW signals are generated using Matlab as described
in Section 5.1 and loaded into the AWG. The OOK-
FMCW signals are amplified and transmitted using a
planar antenna. At the receiver, the signals are cap-
tured using a planar antenna similar to the one used
at the transmitter. The received signal is recorded on a
50 Gsa/s digital storage oscilloscope (DSO). In addition,
the received signal is input to the challenge demodula-
tor circuit [20] which essentially is a Schottky RF peak
detector with programmable gain and a high speed com-
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the values of d = {1 m, 4 m}. (b) Ranging precision. For d = {2, 3, 4}m, the errors in the estimated
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Parameter Value
Sweep bandwidth fbw 100, 200 MHz
Slot period tb 100, 250 ns
Modulation index 75, 100 %
Table 3: Different configurations of the signals
used in the experimental analysis.
parator. The output of the demodulator circuit is also
observed on the oscilloscope. We evaluate our system
for different configurations of OOK-FMCW signals with
the initial sweep frequency f0 set to 2.4 GHz. The var-
ious physical characteristics of the signals used in the
evaluations are listed in Table 3.
5.3 Experimental Results
Challenge Processing Delay tp: The challenge
processing delay tp plays an important role in deciding
the duration of the challenge and response slots tb. In
our experimental setup, tp is the time delay for the en-
ergy detector to demodulate the received OOK-FMCW
challenge signal and switch the output of the compara-
tor. For accurate time delay measurements, the signals
are pre-processed by applying Hilbert transform and
passing it through a median filter (to preserve the ris-
ing and falling edges while reducing noise). Figure 10(a)
shows the response times observed at the receiver over
a number of trials. The processing delay was mea-
sured with the receiver placed at 1 and 4 m away from
the transmitter. The medial delay observed was about
19.5 ns and remained largely unaffected due to distance
from the transmitter. Hence, the value of tb can be fur-
ther reduced to about 50 ns (including fall-time) with-
out affecting the decoding of challenge bits. Addition-
ally, it is observed that the tp values show greater vari-
ance with distance due to the variations in the received
signal’s energy between trials.
Ranging Precision: In order to evaluate the rang-
ing precision, we placed the receiver at distances 2, 3
and 4 m from the transmitter. The distance bound
is calculated using standard FMCW techniques as de-
scribed in Section 3.1 and the results are plotted in Fig-
ure 10(b). It can be observed that our prototype has a
ranging precision of less than a meter for the evaluated
short distances. Due to the limitations of our experi-
mental setup, we could not measure longer distances.
A combination of factors such as range resolution δR
(and hence signal bandwidth), channel multipaths and
the receiver sampling rate affect the precision of a rang-
ing system. Other physical characteristics of the OOK-
FMCW signal such as modulation index, bit (slot) pe-
riod tb and duration of chirp T had no effect on the
precision of the ranging system.
6. CONCLUSION
In this work, we proposed and analyzed a new phys-
ical layer scheme designed specifically for enabling dis-
tance bounding for short-range, low-power application
scenarios. In this proposal, we combined on-off keying
and frequency modulated continuous wave to design a
prover that can potentially be integrated into passive
and semi-passive RFID tags. OOK-FMCW guarantees
the distance bound independent of the processing de-
lay at the prover; irrespective of the distance bounding
protocol implemented. Through our security analysis,
we showed that our system is resilient against distance,
mafia and terrorist fraud attacks. For slot durations
less than 100 ns, we showed that our system is fully re-
silient against an attacker capable of early detection and
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late commit of the challenge and response bits. We ex-
perimentally validated our distance bounding system’s
ranging precision and challenge processing delay. In ad-
dition, our experiments reveal that it is indeed feasible
to realize low-power provers that can process challenges
as fast as ≈ 20 ns.
As part of future work, we intend to build a complete
prototype to fully evaluate our system’s power and per-
formance characteristics. In addition, the feasibility of
using other modulation methods (e.g., ASK, PSK) over
FMCW remains to be explored. The nominal values
for the security relevant parameters such as the time
required to early detect and late commit under these
modulation schemes also needs to be investigated fur-
ther.
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